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Abstract 
Our paper analyses the subnational public finance practices in one of the States 
in India –Kerala- and estimate the fiscal marksmanship. Fiscal marksmanship is the 
analysis of fiscal forecasting errors. Kerala, though well known for its achievements in 
human development outcomes, is facing fiscal stress within the rule-based fiscal 
framework and innovating policy tools to achieve a revenue-led fiscal consolidation. We 
have examined the Budget Estimates, Revised Estimates and Actuals for the macro-
fiscal variables from the Kerala State Budgets, during the period 2011-12 to 2016-17 to 
analyse the significant deviation between the projections and realizations of the State 
finances. We found that the magnitude of forecasting errors was relatively significant in 
case of tax revenue. While partitioning the sources of errors in the budgetary forecasting 
in Kerala, we found that the random components of the error were larger than the 
systematic components for all the macro-fiscal variables, except for own revenue, grants 
and capital expenditure. This has three macro policy implications. One, the volatility in 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers can affect the stability of finances at subnational level. 
Two, the State needs to identify innovative policy tools in Additional Resource 
Mobilisation (ARM) to maintain the human development achievements. Three, within 
the rule-based fiscal framework, State has to innovate financing strategies for 
strengthening growth-inducing capital infrastructure formation.  
Key Words: Fiscal marksmanship, fiscal forecasting errors, fiscal rules.  
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Kerala is well known for their pro-active State role in human development financing 
and the remarkable outcome in education, health and nutrition (RBI 2018, Niti Aayog, 
2017, Chakraborty et al 2010). However, the fiscal stress of the State to maintain the 
human development achievements and the capital infrastructure formation, given the 
compressed fiscal space due to the rule-based fiscal framework, is getting attention in 
Indian public finances at subnational level. The recent reports of Kerala State Public 
Expenditure Committee highlighted that revenue-led fiscal consolidation is what State 
attempts to do (Government of Kerala 2017 and 2018). However, the volatility in 
revenue – both own revenue including the challenges from GST and the devolution in 
Central tax share and grants – is a matter of serious concern. 
There is lack of clarity in the apportionment of ISGT, the portion given to the States. 
There are concerns about the phasing out of revenue deficit grants by the Finance 
Commission. The intergovernmental fiscal transfer mechanism has also undergone 
change after the phasing out of Plan and Non-plan distinction of grants. The cyclicality 
of returns, and ease of filing returns regarding GST are also affecting the revenue 
mobilization. All these affect the State’s projections and aspirations about Additional 
Revenue Mobilization (ARM).   
The fiscal space for meeting revenue expenditure, especially the salary and pensions and 
interest payments out of own revenue receipts (the “golden rule” of meeting revenue 
expenditure from own revenue receipts and not through borrowing) is shrinking. The 
extra borrowing powers of the State is limited by Central Government, though the 
fourteenth Finance Commission has carved out a strategy for the States based on 
certain criteria, if met, to make them eligible for extra borrowing powers.  Also, the 
State has recently initiated trading of rupee-denominated “masala bonds” to finance 
capital investment. The impact of masala bonds is beyond the scope of our paper as it 
is off-budget borrowing.  
Against this backdrop, we examine the fiscal behaviour of Kerala State in terms of “fiscal 
marksmanship” – the fiscal forecasting errors – of the macro-fiscal variables in the State 
Budgets. It is often argued that forecasting of government revenues and expenditure is 
essential for government budgeting. Empirical evidence suggests that underestimating 
the forecasts can lead to undesirable deficit/ debt levels, whereas overestimating 
forecasts would mean unnecessary surplus which could have otherwise spent for 
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productive purposes. Furthermore, in cases where the predicted values are 
underestimated and the economy is running a deficit, one might not have an alternative 
source of financing these deficits which can cause problems for budget execution. 
Hence, accurate forecasting becomes essential. 
Fiscal marksmanship is an exercise to assess the forecasting errors. While assessing the 
forecasting errors, there are primarily two aspects that need to be considered. Firstly, 
the extent of the forecasting error and secondly, the components of forecasting error. 
Our paper analyses the magnitude and sources of budget forecasting errors in Kerala.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II review the literature. Section 
III explains the data sources and methodology. Section IV interprets the estimates. 
Section V concludes and draws policy suggestions. 
 
II Literature Review 
One of the earlier attempts on fiscal marksmanship analysis was made by Allan (1965) 
in the case of Britain. According to Allan, the importance of fiscal marksmanship 
during that time was because that the margin for error was limited, given the tradeoff 
between inflation and full employment. In such a scenario, accurate predictions of 
budgetary estimates were important to meet the fiscal policy targets of having full 
employment without undesirably high inflation. Davis (1980), following up on Allan’s 
study has taken a longer time series (from 1951 to 1978).  Auld (1970) has done a fiscal 
marksmanship exercise for Canada for the post war period, till 1968. Auld (1970) says 
that if the government is to finance its long range programmes, accurate predictions is 
important. Morrison (1986) has done a fiscal marksmanship exercise in the United 
States for the years 1950-1983.  
There have been a number of fiscal marksmanship exercises in the case of India. In one 
of the earlier attempts at analyzing budgetary estimates in India (for 1956-64), Paul and 
Rangarajan (1974) has done an analysis of two components of the capital expenditure 
of the state and union budget, namely construction and industrial development (the 
analysis was limited to these two because of the scope of the subject matter they were 
dealing with). In this study, the analysis of forecasting errors was based largely on 
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graphs plotting the actual expenditure and the budget estimates. In their analysis, it is 
stated that while in both the components the budget estimates of the center were more 
accurate compared to the state. This difference was attributed to the different in 
efficiency in the budgetary process.  
Asher (1978) has performed a more comprehensive fiscal marksmanship exercise for 
India for the period 1967-68 to 1975-76 for both the revised and budget estimates. The 
study showed that during that period, both the revenues and expenditures were 
consistently underestimated.  However, it was observed that the extent of error for the 
expenditure side was larger. Chakrabarty and Varghese (1982) have used data from 
1970-71 to 1979-80. One of the major findings of that study was that both revenues and 
expenditure and underestimated. Pattnaik (1990) has done a fiscal marksmanship 
exercise using the Theil’s Index for the period 1951 to 1989. The study observes that the 
errors in the revised estimates are lower than the errors in the budget estimate (although 
there are large errors in both). It is stated that largely most of the errors in the estimates 
are systematic in nature for both the entire time period as well as sub time periods (the 
systematic errors were maximum for the period 1981 to 1989).  
More recent studies on fiscal marksmanship in India have a different conclusion. A 
study done by K Nitin and Roy (2014), on the political economy conundrums of Finance 
Commissions, using data from 1990-91 to 2011-12 observes that the source of error in 
components such as tax revenue, non-tax revenue, interest payments, defense revenue 
expenditure, plan revenue expenditure and fiscal deficit were primarily due to random 
error. Rest of the components such as subsidy expenditure, non-plan revenue 
expenditure, capital expenditure and non-debt capital receipts had a higher systematic 
error (mean error and slope error). A very interesting point made in the paper is that 
while there is an attempt to have fiscal consolidation by controlling expenditure, the 
predictability of expenditure is quite low compared to revenue. In a similar study, 
Chakraborty and Sinha (2018) has done a fiscal marksmanship exercise of Union 
Budgets for the period 1990-1991 to 2016-17 and have come up with a similar conclusion. 
While we have elaborated on the studies which have been done at a national level, in 
this paper we focus on fiscal behaviour of subnational governments in India, by focusing 
on Kerala.  
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III Data and Methodology 
The period of analysis is 2011-12 to 2016-17. We used the data from the Finance Accounts 
for the State of Kerala. The methodology used in the paper - using Theil’s Index - is 
elaborated as follows.  
III.1: The Theil’s Index 
The methodology which is used to assess the accuracy of a forecast is Theil’s Index 
(Theil 1958). It is defined as:  
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Here, Pt is the predicted value at time t, and At is the actual value at time t. U1 is the 
inequality coefficient. The range of U1, is from zero to 1. In case of a perfect forecast, the 
value of U1 is 0, that is, Pt equals At. The value of U1 equals one when either the value of 
Pt is equal to 0, for all At or the value of At equals 0 for all Pt. Unfortunately, this method 
has some serious defects. When one considers the actuals and the predicted values 
which have similar forecast errors but are at different distance from the origin they give 
very different values of U1.  This is a limitation of U1.  
There is a revised version of the Theil’s Index (Theil 1966). It is measured as follows: 
U2 = 
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Unlike U1, which had a fixed range of 0 and 1, U2 is not bounded on both sides. While 
it does have a lower bound of 0, it does not have an upper bound. This is because the 
denominator does not consist of the root of the summation of P-squared divided by n, 
unlike U1. Similar to U1, perfect forecast in case of U2 is equal to 0.  
A more rigorous index is the U3. This has been used in Bhattacharya and Kumari 
(1988). Here, Qt and at are lags, that is Qt equals Pt – P (t-1) and at = At – A t-1 
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III.2: Types of Errors 
There are two types of errors - systematic and unsystematic errors. We attempt to derive 
it in this section. To begin with,  
 !"∑ 𝑃𝑖 − 𝐴𝑖 ( = 𝑃 − 𝐴 ( + 𝑠𝑝 − 𝑠𝐴 ( + 2 1 − 𝑟 	𝑠𝑝	𝑠𝐴 
If we divide both sides by 222 )/1/1( åå + tt AnPn  (we will call this term D) we 
will get equation (1), 12∑ 𝑃𝑖 − 𝐴𝑖 (𝐷( = 𝑃 − 𝐴 (𝐷( + 𝑠𝑝 − 𝑠𝐴 (𝐷( + 2 1 − 𝑟 	𝑠𝑝	𝑠𝐴𝐷(  
And,  
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Dividing both sides by D2 we have,  
1 = 456 8
å - 2)(/1 tt APn
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For the sake of simplicity, we will label the above equation as,  
1 = Um + Us + Uc  
The first two components (Um and Us) of the equation is termed as the systematic error 
whereas the term Uc is the random error (David, 1978). If the systematic component of 
error is high, one can improve the forecasting by improving the forecasting method. 
This can be done adding more variables into the forecasting model or also by 
incorporating the fluctuations in the variables in the model. In case the random error is 
high, one cannot improve the forecasting further and the model used to estimate the 
error is a good model (Theil, 1958). We will see which component is higher in the case 
of Kerala.  
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IV. State Finances of Kerala: Interpreting the Estimates 
As a prelude to interpreting the fiscal marksmanship, a quick glance of the State 
finances of Kerala is given here. The revenue receipts to GSDP in Kerala is around 12 
per cent in 2016-17.  The tax revenue to GSDP is around 9.23 per cent in 2016-17. The 
tax revenue has two components, one is from own taxes including the GST, and the 
other is the share in central tax transfers.  The cyclicality and uncertainties in GST 
returns and the tax devolution by the Finance Commission are two crucial aspects of 
revenue stability for the State. The non-tax revenue mainly consists of two components, 
own non-tax revenue including the lotteries, and the grants from the centre. The 
volatility in these components can also affect the State revenue. The phasing out of 
revenue deficits grants can affect the flow of funds to the State. As mentioned-above  
the lack of transparency relates to sharing of IGST apportioning is yet another crucial 
area of concern.  
Table 1: State Finances of Kerala (as per cent of GSDP) 
Kerala 
Total 
Revenue 
Receipts 
(b+c)  
Tax 
Revenu(
b) 
Non-tax 
Revenue 
© 
Revenue 
Expenditure 
(e+f+g) 
Gener
al 
Servic
e  
(e) 
  Social 
Service
s 
(f) 
Econo
mic 
Servic
es 
(g) 
Capit
al 
Expe
nditu
re 
2011-12 10.44 8.71 1.73 12.65 5.58 4.46 1.68 1.06 
2012-13 10.70 8.95 1.75 12.97 5.53 4.58 1.89 1.12 
2013-
14 10.57 8.49 2.09 13.01 5.72 4.51 1.71 0.92 
2014-
15 11.31 8.42 2.89 14.00 6.13 4.63 1.99 0.83 
2015-
16 12.29 9.20 3.09 14.01 6.43 4.92 1.98 1.34 
2016-
17 12.16 9.23 2.93 14.65 6.63 5.43 1.71 1.63 
Source: (Basic Data), CAG Finance Accounts of Kerala (various years) and CSO 
estimates, Govt of India 
 
The revenue expenditure to GSDP ratio is 14.65 %. The social service spending to 
GSDP ratio is around 5 per cent in the State. The capital expenditure to GSDP ratio 
is only around 1 per cent. Over the years, though capital expenditure has declined from 
1.12 per cent of GSDP in 2012-13 to 0.83 per cent in 2014-15, one can see a marginal 
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increase to 1.63 per cent in 2016-17. The State has recently initiated rupee-denominated 
“masala bonds” for capital investment through public sector entity. These bonds are 
backed by State guarantee. Kerala is the first State to go to international bond market 
for trading in rupee-denominated masala bonds. The impact of these initiatives on fiscal 
marksmanship is beyond the scope of our paper as it is off-budget initiatives.  
Table 2: Deficits as per cent of GSDP in Kerala  
 
Revenue Deficit  
 
Fiscal Deficit  
 Primary Deficit  
2011-12 2.21 3.52 1.79 
2012-13 2.27 3.64 1.89 
2013-14 2.43 3.64 1.87 
2014-15 2.69 3.64 1.74 
2015-16 1.72 3.18 1.20 
2016-17 2.49 4.25 2.31 
Source: (Basic Data), CAG Finance Accounts of Kerala (various years) and CSO 
estimates, Govt of India 
Kerala has fiscal deficit to GSDP ratio higher than the rule-based numerical threshold, 
which clearly shows the fiscal stress of the State to achieve fiscal consolidation through 
revenue buoyancy and not through expenditure compression. Therefore, it is crucial for 
us to analyse the fiscal marksmanship of the State, disaggregating various macro-fiscal 
variables to understand the sources of errors in their fiscal forecasting and budgetary 
management.  
Prior to estimate the Theil’s U estimates, Table 3 gives simple fiscal marksmanship 
ratios of BE/Actuals and RE/Actuals. These ratios would reflect whether the macro-
fiscal variables are over-estimates or underestimates (in aggregate). We observe that the 
BE/Actuals of the aggregate revenue receipts are overestimates during the time period. 
This means that the value of BE/Actuals is greater than 1. For tax revenue and non-tax 
revenue, it is 1.06 and 1.10 respectively. However, when we observe the same variables 
for the RE, we find the variables are slightly underestimated.  
When we observe the expenditure side, we infer that there is an improvement in the 
estimates from the BE to the RE. By improvement, we mean that the extent of 
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overestimation has declined from BE to RE. The BE/Actuals for the revenue 
expenditure and capital expenditure are 1.16 and 1.26 respectively. Both have 
experienced some degree of improvement in the RE, as the RE/Actuals have declined 
to 1.13 and 1.09 respectively (Table 3).  
 
Table 3:  Simple Ratios of Fiscal marksmanship in Kerala 
  BE/Actuals RE/Actuals 
Total Revenue Receipts (I+II) 1.07 0.99 
 I. Tax Revenue (i+ii) 1.06 0.94 
States Own Tax Revenue (i) 1.14 1.06 
Share in Central Taxes (ii)  1.02 1.03 
II. Non Tax Revenue (iii+iv) 1.10 1.14 
States Own Non Tax Revenue (iii) 0.99 1.05 
Grants From Center (iv) 1.22 1.24 
Revenue Expenditure (v+vi+vii) 1.16 1.13 
Social Services (v) 1.05 1.01 
Economic Services (vi)  1.06 1.08 
General  Services (vii) 0.97 0.98 
Capital Expenditure 1.26 1.09 
Revenue Deficit 1.40 1.44 
Fiscal Deficit  1.33 1.30 
Primary Deficit  1.69 1.61 
Source: (Basic Data), Finance Accounts (various years), Government of Kerala 
The point to be noted here is the significant volatility occurred in BE to Actuals in case 
of grants (1.22) on the revenue side, and capital spending (1.26) on the expenditure side. 
Now we turn to the Theil’s U estimates of macro-fiscal variables. 
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IV.1: Theil’s U for Budget Estimates 
Table 4 shows that for the value of U1, the errors in the total revenue receipts are low, 
at 0.054. Correspondingly, the components of total revenue receipts, i.e. tax revenue 
and non- tax revenue, are also low at 0.075 and 0.082 respectively. 
Table 4: Tax and Non-Tax revenue: Theil’s U for Budget Estimates and Actuals  
U Total Revenue 
Receipts 
Tax Revenue Non-tax Revenue 
U1 0.054 0.075 0.082 
U2 0.111 0.154 0.172 
U3 0.443 0.624 0.509 
Source: (Basic Data), Finance Accounts (various years), Government of Kerala 
When we consider the revenue expenditure and capital expenditure, it can be observed 
that the value of U1 is 0.152 and 0.168 respectively.  Overall, based on U1, which is 
measured in the scale 0-1, we can infer that the errors are quite low (Table 5). 
Table 5: Revenue and Capital Expenditure: Theil’s U for Budget Estimates and 
Actuals 
U Revenue Expenditure Capital Expenditure 
U1 0.152 0.168 
U2 0.332 0.374 
U3 0.791 0.644 
Source: (Basic Data), Finance Accounts (various years), Government of Kerala 
The primary deficit has highest magnitude of error at 0.612 when compared to revenue 
deficit (0.532) and fiscal deficit (0.417) (Table 6).  This pattern is observed for all indices 
of Theil (U1, U2 and U3).  The fiscal deficit has less error in projections when compared 
to revenue deficit, may give a hint that the fiscal adjustments has happened in capital 
spending, to adhere to numerical threshold ratios of deficits prescribed in FRBM.  
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Table 6: Deficits: Theil’s U for Budget Estimates and Actuals 
U Revenue Deficit  
 
Fiscal Deficit  
 
Primary Deficit  
 
U1 0.532 0.417 0.612 
U2 1.661 1.119 2.270 
U3 0.949 0.950 0.973 
Source: (Basic Data), Finance Accounts (various years), Government of Kerala 
 
IV.2: Theil’s U for Revised Estimates 
From Table 7, we observe that the value of U1 of RE for total revenue receipts is slightly 
higher than that of BE. The value of U1 for the total revenue receipt is quite low, i.e. 
0.064. Correspondingly, the tax revenue and non-tax revenue is also similar to that of 
BE, that is 0.087 and 0.070 respectively (Table 7).  
Table 7: Tax and Non-Tax revenue: Theil’s Index for the Revised Estimates 
 Total Revenue Receipts Tax Revenue Non-tax Revenue 
U1 0.064 0.087 0.070 
U2 0.126 0.169 0.150 
U3 0.644 0.974 0.390 
Source: (Basic Data), Finance Accounts (various years), Government of Kerala 
On the other hand, the value of U1 for the revenue expenditure, and capital expenditure 
is respectively 0.128 and 0.118 (Table 8). From this, we can infer that for these 
components, the RE have a lower forecasting error than that of BE. Overall, besides 
the total revenue, we can conclude that the estimates have either remained similar or 
improved from BE to RE.  
Table 8: Revenue and Capital Expenditure: Theil’s Index for the Revised Estimates 
 Revenue Expenditure Capital Expenditure 
U1 0.128 0.118 
U2 0.274 0.240 
U3 0.741 0.588 
Source: (Basic Data), Finance Accounts (various years), Government of Kerala 
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The Theil’s Us based on RE –Actuals also revealed that primary deficit has the highest 
magnitude of error when compared to revenue deficit and fiscal deficit. Primary deficit 
is fiscal deficit deducted for interest payments, which reflects the current fiscal policy 
stance of the government. The fiscal sustainability of a government can be either based 
on primary surplus or based on the principle of real rate of interest less than the real rate 
of growth of economy. The significant magnitude of errors in the primary deficit reflects 
the stress of the government’s current fiscal policy stance. 
 
Table 9: Deficits: Theil’s Index for the Revised Estimates 
 Revenue Deficit  
 
Fiscal Deficit  
 
Primary Deficit  
 
U1 0.503 0.380 0.573 
U2 1.487 0.961 1.932 
U3 0.955 0.932 0.955 
Source: (Basic Data), Finance Accounts (various years), Government of Kerala 
IV.3: Interpreting the Error components 
At the aggregate level, when we observe the key components of revenue and 
expenditure in BE, we infer that for total revenue receipt (both tax revenue and  non-
tax revenue), revenue expenditure and capital expenditure the random component of 
the error is greater than the systematic component (i.e. it is greater than 0.5). More 
precisely, the random error for these components are 0.62, 0.85, 0.54, 0.60 and 0.59 
respectively (Table 10).  
At the disaggregated level analysis of revenue receipts, an important point to be noted 
in Table 10 is the systematic errors in the own tax revenue projections in Kerala. In the 
non-tax revenue component, the systemic errors (0.49) in grants was found as high as 
the random errors (0.50).  On the expenditure side, the errors in social sector 
expenditure were found to be both systematic bias (0.45) and random errors (0.55). This 
might be the reflection of the adjustments in the State budgets in the social sector 
despite projecting high in Budget Estimate phase. The capital expenditure also 
incurred systematic errors (0.41) and random errors (0.59).  
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Table 10: Error components of the Budget Estimates 
 𝑷 − 𝑨 𝟐𝑫𝟐  𝒔𝒑 − 𝒔𝒂 𝟐𝑫𝟐  𝟐 𝟏 − 𝒓 	𝒔𝒑	𝒔𝒂𝑫𝟐  
Total Revenue Receipt 
(I+II) 
0.38 0.00 0.62 
I. Tax Revenue (i+ii) 0.15 0.00 0.85 
States Own Tax 
Revenue (i) 
0.80 0.12 0.08 
Share in Central Taxes 
(ii) 
0.08 0.08 0.84 
II. Non-tax Revenue 0.30 0.16 0.54 
State Own Non-Tax 
Revenue (iii) 
0.00 0.49 0.51 
Grants from Centre (iv) 0.49 0.01 0.50 
Revenue Expenditure 
(v+vi+vii) 
0.23 0.17 0.60 
General Services (v) 0.24 0.61 0.15 
Social Services (vi) 0.45 0.00 0.55 
Economic Services (vii) 0.12 0.44 0.45 
Capital Expenditure 0.41 0.00 0.59 
Revenue Deficit  0.06 0.71 0.23 
Fiscal Deficit  0.08 0.56 0.35 
Primary Deficit  0.08 0.69 0.22 
Note: *D2 = 222 )/1/1( åå + tt AnPn  
Source: Source: (Basic Data), Finance Accounts (various years), Government 
of Kerala 
In RE, in the case of total revenue receipts and revenue expenditure, the random 
component is greater than 0.5. Specifically, they are 0.61 and 0.74 respectively. 
However, disaggregating the tax revenue into own tax revenue and tax transfers, we 
found that bias in projections was prominently high for own tax revenue projections 
(0.78) (Table 11). The own non-tax revenue projections also have shown bias relatively 
higher than random errors. This has policy implications in terms of reforming the 
lottery revenue. The grants from Centre also have shown high systematic bias (0.76). 
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The volatility in grants to the States also affect the stability of revenue at the State level. 
On the expenditure front, in case of capital expenditure, the systematic component 
(0.42) is found greater than the random component (0.17). (Table 11).  
Table 11: Error components of the Revised Estimates 
RE 𝑷 − 𝑨 𝟐𝑫𝟐  𝒔𝒑 − 𝒔𝒂 𝟐𝑫𝟐  𝟐 𝟏 − 𝒓 	𝒔𝒑	𝒔𝒂𝑫𝟐  
Total Revenue Receipt 
(I+II)  
0.01 0.38 0.61 
I. Tax Revenue  0.11 0.31 0.58 
States Own Tax Revenue 
(i) 
0.78 0.02 0.20 
Share in Central Taxes 
(ii) 
0.51 0.01 0.48 
II. Non-tax Revenue 
(iii+iv) 
0.81 0.02 0.17 
State Own Non-Tax 
Revenue iii) 
0.74 0.10 0.16 
Grants from Centre (iv) 0.76 0.00 0.24 
Revenue Expenditure 
(v+vi+vii) 
0.23 0.03 0.74 
General Services (v) 0.48 0.41 0.11 
Social Services (vi) 0.05 0.08 0.87 
Economic Services (vii) 0.45 0.30 0.25 
Capital Expenditure 0.12 0.46 0.42 
Revenue Deficit  0.08 0.58 0.33 
Fiscal Deficit  0.09 0.44 0.47 
Primary Deficit  0.09 0.62 0.29 
Note: *D2 = 222 )/1/1( åå + tt AnPn  
Source: (Basic Data), Finance Accounts (various years), Government of Kerala 
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For BE, we can interpret that for most of the key components, there is little room for 
improvement of forecast error as most of them have the random components which are 
higher than the systematic error. What is interesting is that, while we move from the 
BE to RE, the systematic component of the capital expenditure and non-tax revenue 
has a relatively higher systematic component. This means that the fiscal marksmanship 
can be improved by using better policy innovations, to deal with the constrained fiscal 
space within the fiscal rules.  
 
V Conclusion 
The subnational public finance practices in Kerala is significant to analyse to 
understand the challenges of revenue-led fiscal consolidation in an emerging country 
like India. Against the backdrop of fiscal rules, we analyse the fiscal marksmanship – the 
fiscal forecast errors - in the context of Kerala. The magnitude of the fiscal forecasting 
errors is found relatively higher for tax revenue. The sources of errors - decomposed into 
biasedness, unequal variation and random components - are analyzed and our results 
found that the proportion of error due to random component has been significantly 
higher than systematic bias for all the macro-fiscal variables, except for own revenue 
(both own tax and own non-tax), grants and capital expenditure.  This has policy 
implications as volatility in intergovernmental transfers can affect the stability of 
subnational public finances. Identifying innovative policy tools in strengthening 
Additional Resource Mobilisation (ARM) programmes is significant to maintain the 
human development achievements of the State and also the growth-inducing capital 
formation in Kerala.  
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